Public relations ethics: a simpler (but not simplistic) approach to the complexities by Harrison, Karey & Galloway, Chris
 
Harrison, K., & Galloway, C. (2005). Public relations ethics: A simpler (but not simplistic) approach to the 
complexities. Prism 3. Available at: http://praxis.massey.ac.nz 
 
 Public relations ethics: A simpler (but not simplistic) approach to the 
complexities  
 
 
Karey Harrison, University of Southern Queensland 
Chris Galloway, Monash University 
 
 
 
Professional public relations bodies 
internationally have established ethics codes in 
an attempt to regulate members’ ethical 
behaviour. This paper critiques the code-based 
framework on philosophical and practical 
grounds, suggesting that such frameworks are 
inadequate because they leave practitioners free 
to interpret these guides in ways that advance 
their own and their clients’ interests. We argue 
that this latitude does not foster ethical 
behaviour. We then contrast rule-following, 
action-based ethics with agent-based ethics, 
conceived in Aristotelian terms, and suggest 
that the virtue ethics advanced by Aristotle and 
his interpreters represents a more challenging 
but more authentically ethical path for 
practitioners to consider. 
 
Introduction 
 
Even if many public relations practitioners 
are not “amoral sheep that blindly service their 
clients with reckless ethical abandon” (Lieber, 
2003, p.43), the public relations industry has 
become synonymous with ethical slipperiness to 
the extent that a leading academic at a recent 
conference equated public relations directly with 
“deceptive communication” (cited in Galloway, 
2004, ¶.1).  
This is just one indicator that ethical issues 
remain pressing for public relations 
professionals, who may if they wish inform their 
decision-making with a considerable range of 
recommended guides and models, including 
professional ethics codes, or tests such as 
TARES, “mum”, or “front page” (Lieber, 1998; 
Tilley, in press). The existence of such aids is 
no guarantee of ethical behaviour, as a recent 
case in the US demonstrates. The case involved 
a commentator, Armstrong Williams, failing to 
disclose he was paid by a client of Ketchum 
Public Relations, the US Department of 
Education, to tout a piece of Bush 
administration legislation. In a statement on the 
case, Ketchum acknowledged that its work “did 
not comply with the guidelines of our agency 
and our industry” (van der Pool, 2005, ¶.5). 
Ethical nostrums designed to address 
professional practice issues often rest on the 
bedrock assumption that clarity is the chief 
question. This is true of the business ethics 
debate generally, as well as the public relations 
ethics debate specifically. For example, in a 
recent Economist piece on business ethics, Clive 
Cook (2005) comments, “It is lack of clarity 
about business ethics that gives rise to confusion 
over what managers’ responsibilities are, and 
where the limits of those responsibilities lie” 
(p.14). The assumption has been that if only 
practitioners knew what was ethical (or not), if 
only they had a practicable ethical model to 
apply, they would be able to choose to operate 
in an ethical way: and would, in fact, do so. In 
line with this belief, public relations 
professional bodies around the world have 
developed ethics codes,1 and some (in the US) 
have introduced an ethical decision-making 
advisory service to help meet this perceived 
need for lucidity.  
These are action-based approaches to ethics 
(Dobson, 2004). However, whether expressed as 
                                                 
1 The authors accept that code authors sincerely seek to 
improve the industry’s ethical performance. However, 
other motivations may include a desire to pre-empt 
external regulation (Longstaff, 1994) or to provide “one 
of the key attributes of any profession” (Tallant & 
Ryberg, n.d., p.2) with the aim of reinforcing perceptions 
that public relations has or should be accorded the status 
of a profession. 
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a preoccupation with rules governing action, as 
in ethics codes, or as a consequentialist 
utilitarian calculus (meaning that, within a free 
market framework, maximum collective utility 
is seen as a sum of individual utility represented 
as pursuit of self-interest) such action 
approaches to ethics do little to truly illuminate 
the ethical dilemmas practitioners frequently 
face. By contrast, agent-based approaches 
focusing on the character and motivations of 
individual agents tend to provide much greater 
clarification of actual ethical issues.  
A comparison between action and agent 
approaches enables us to evaluate the relevance 
to public relations of Dobson’s (1997) “Trojan 
horse” argument. Dobson proposes applying 
agent-based Aristotelian ethical concepts to 
business ethics in general, but believes that this 
application exposes as simulacra actions 
undertaken simply for the sake of acquiring 
material wealth. He argues that bringing in 
agent-based ethics acts like a Trojan horse, 
opening the door to significant system changes.  
We explore responses to a key question that 
crystallises the virtues approach to ethics—
‘What is it that public relations practitioners do 
of which they are (or can be) proud?’—in order 
to show that a virtues approach to ethics does 
more to illuminate the daily dilemmas of public 
relations practitioners than code and 
consequentialist approaches. Our purpose is 
simply to highlight this illuminative value rather 
than to offer any comprehensive prescription for 
public relations ethics: we do not believe that 
one exists. In moving to explore approaches to 
substantive ethical behaviour in public relations, 
we critically extend the work of writers such as 
Martinson (2000) and Harrison (2004), who 
seek to apply Aristotelian concepts to public 
relations practice.  
 
Complexities 
 
It is in the nature of professional (including 
public relations) practice that when work begins 
on a client brief or employer assignment, only 
the immediate contours of the landscape are 
visible. Best practice in public relations calls for 
“input research” (Singh & Glenny, 2004, p.142) 
when a public relations campaign is being 
planned. Without it, practitioners can be 
“reduced to taking, at best, educated guesses 
regarding the problem and potential intervention 
programs” (Stacks, 2002, p.4). The input 
research results guide programme planning 
decisions. At this initial stage it is entirely 
possible that ethical choices may not present 
themselves: or at least, may not appear in the 
forms in which they later develop. As an 
example, one of the authors previously worked 
for a major telecommunications utility. The job 
required sustained policy advocacy with 
politicians and officials. This was not 
problematic when the issues in play revolved 
around regulatory matters. Debates in these 
areas were more a question of which school of 
economic thought was preferred (although there 
were clear financial consequences for the 
company if a more-regulation approach was 
adopted, and the author’s brief was to advocate 
for the least regulated market possible). 
Continued work in an advocacy role did, 
however, become problematic at a later stage, 
when the company’s personnel policies were at 
issue. The author felt that it was not possible in 
conscience to make a sustainable case for these 
policies, which arguably focused on promoting 
shareholder value at the expense of employee 
wellbeing. Ultimately a decision was made to 
seek a job elsewhere. 
In this case and others like it, determining an 
appropriate path is not simply a matter of 
consulting an ethics code. As previous writers 
(Luegenbiehl, 1983, cited in Center for the 
Study of Ethics in the Professions, n.d.; Wright, 
1993) have pointed out (and corporate scandals 
such as Enron and, in Australia, James Hardie 
and HIH, have highlighted), the faith that 
business broadly and public relations in 
particular (see, for example, Marshall, 2002) 
puts in ethical codes is misplaced. 
Ethics codes contain only a few general 
principles or key values (Longstaff, 1994). 
Public relations codes typically include ethical 
advocacy, honesty, integrity, expertise, and 
loyalty. Such values need to be understood and 
interpreted before they can be applied to specific 
situations, however. In promoting such 
principles, public relations industry bodies 
whose ethical stance suggests that practitioners 
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should be committed to ‘serving the client’s 
interest’ through principled advocacy and 
confidentiality, while simultaneously serving an 
undefined ‘public interest’, risk ignoring the 
potential for conflict between these values. The 
resulting outcomes may reflect practitioner 
confusion about which ethical path to take. 
Faced with potentially clashing values, and 
given the generic nature of codes, public 
relations practitioners in effect remain free to 
favour the value which best serves their career 
and employment prospects. They can do so 
while remaining confident they are adhering to 
their professional code and keeping its specific 
ethical credentials intact (Olasky, 1985, cited in 
Hunt & Tirpok, 1993). In practice, however, 
they are most likely to prioritise client or 
employer interests. Olasky quotes a practitioner 
as saying: “There are no lies anymore, just 
interests waiting to be served” (cited in Pearson, 
1989, p.68). As Pratt (1993) notes, public 
relations practice aligns with each client 
organisation’s strategic direction and its 
dominant coalition’s interests.  
In practice, the clarity envisaged in codes-
focussed public relations ethics literature seems 
elusive: instead, practitioners must make the 
best choices they can as shifting day-by-day 
practical needs require a tack in this or that 
direction. The Global Alliance for Public 
Relations and Communication Management 
(GAPRCM) seems to recognise these 
limitations in the preamble to its ‘Guiding 
Principles for the Ethical Practice of Public 
Relations’: 
 
A code of ethics and professional 
conduct is an individual matter that 
should be viewed as a guide to make 
(sic) sound values-based decisions. 
Ethical performance, not principles, is 
ultimately what counts. No-one can 
dictate precise outcomes for every 
situation. However, we can apply 
common values and decision-making 
processes to arrive at a decision and 
justify it to others. (GAPRCM, n.d., ¶.2) 
 
The Alliance highlights the dilemma for 
practitioners in its “decision-making guide” 
when it advises professionals to “select the 
ethical principles to guide the decision-making 
process” (GAPRCM, n.d., ¶.10). In proffering 
this vague counsel, the Alliance fails to 
recognise that neither in practice nor in 
academia is there consensus or common ground 
as to which principles are to be preferred (c.f. 
Ryan & Martinson, 1984, cited in Pearson, 
1989). On the one hand, authors like O’Malley 
(n.d.), Martinson (2004), and Edgett (2002) 
argue for prioritising client interests, while on 
the other, authors such as Walle (2003) 
represent a stream of thought that advocates 
prioritising public interest. There is no 
consensus as to how practitioners are to weave 
their way through the minefield of competing 
ethical imperatives. 
In light of the generalised nature of codes and 
the fact that they “are not taken seriously by the 
majority of those who practice public relations” 
(Wright, 1993, p.16), it is not surprising that 
“the predominant ethical system in the public 
relations field is a situational perspective” 
(Leeper, 1996, p.134; c.f. Pratt, 1993). Ethical 
orientations that have been labelled 
‘situationalist’ range from utilitarian versions 
envisaging decision-making based on “what 
would cause the least harm or most good” 
(Skinner, Mersham, & Valin, 2003, p.17) to an 
‘anything goes’) approach which sees whatever 
action an individual is able to live with, at least 
short-term, as the only constraint (Leeper, 
1996). Public relations is largely tarred with this 
latter brush: “Too often the public perceives 
practitioners as people willing to ‘do anything’ 
to further a client/organisation’s special interest” 
(Martinson, 2004, p.4). 
Caught in ethical cross-currents, practitioners 
may well resort to situational relativism while at 
the same time asking themselves whether there 
is an alternative. Below we identify a broader 
backdrop to public relations’ ethical issues 
before introducing Aristotle’s agent-based 
concept of virtue ethics, and exploring its 
applicability to public relations decision-
making. 
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Murkiness 
 
Aligning ourselves with Wright’s criticism of 
ethics codes in public relations as “more 
cosmetic than anything else” (1993, p.16) we 
suggest that the concerns driving development 
of public relations ethics codes belong to a 
wider picture of corporate moral murkiness. 
Public relations is both caught in this murk and 
a contributor to it (CPRF, n.d.). Public relations’ 
complicity in corporate economising with the 
truth is one reason why the good intentions 
behind ethics codes are so often undermined, 
and a cause of growing interest in the concept of 
messenger liability, which seeks to extend 
potential legal liability to every firm involved in 
the communication chain before and after 
information is released to the public (Lasky, 
2002). Public relations’ ethical dilemmas are 
systemic as well as specific, inherent in the way 
contemporary organisations operate (or choose 
to function) as much as in the particular nature 
of public relations practice. The ‘crisis of trust’ 
in contemporary capitalism, and public 
relations’ implication in this crisis, has led to 
renewed calls for moral corporate behaviour, 
including moral communication performance.  
Interestingly, the United States-based 
Council of Public Relations Firms locates the 
root of corporate debacles and failures in “a 
bankruptcy of morality” (CPRF n.d., ¶.4), rather 
than in misdeeds legally defined. In a white 
paper on trust—“the intangible corporate value 
that forms the basis of public confidence”—it 
speaks of top executives tarnished by the “virus 
of distrust, scepticism and cynicism” (n.d., ¶.4) 
introduced by Enron. The Council suggests 
chief executives wanting to restore public trust 
in their organisations could: embrace 
transparency; set new standards such as 
safeguarding the corporate brand; be 
accountable for more than profits; and be 
socially responsible. Concerns about 
communication are raised in their comment that: 
 
Implicit, however, is the need for 
sophisticated talent capable of 
addressing and expressing the elements 
of trustworthiness. The challenge is to 
sensitively find ways to communicate 
that are credible and consistent with 
company action, to walk the talk (CPRF, 
n.d., ¶.34). 
 
Leaving aside the question of whether a 
company’s action is itself ethical, and taking the 
Council to be referring to a challenge for public 
relations practitioners employed by its member 
firms, the Council’s opinions raise the issue of 
whether the necessary communication talent 
exists. If so, how is it to guide itself in a way 
that fosters trustworthiness? If the Council is 
correct in its assessment that corporate scandals 
“represent moral failings and abandonment of 
ethics and integrity as well as possibly blatant 
legal violations” (CPRF, n.d., ¶.8), can public 
relations, as an integral part of much 
contemporary corporate life, find a path for 
itself and its clients out of what a 1932 New 
York Herald Tribune editor described as the 
“red-light district of human relations”? (cited in 
Baker & Martinson, 2002, p.15).  
 
Agent ethics 
 
Even where ethics codes are presented 
simply as sets of guidelines, there is an 
underlying expectation that they will offer 
sufficient support to wise practitioners 
confronting ethical choices to enable resolution. 
Yet most practitioners have “little training in 
ethical analysis or decision making” (Bowen, 
2004, p.85). The ambiguous expectation integral 
to public relations ethics codes—that 
practitioners can somehow simultaneously serve 
both their client’s interest and the public 
interest—means codes can offer little 
practicable guidance in specific situations. The 
Public Relations Society of America’s 
descriptions of its code as a “useful guide” 
(n.d.b., ¶.1) and a “model” (¶.5) still leave 
interpretation dilemmas firmly in the 
practitioner’s lap, even though an advisory 
service is available (c.f. Bowen, 2004, p.75).  
Industry reliance on codified ethical crutches 
runs deep: while Martinson (2000) refers to 
virtue ethics as a source of assistance to 
practitioners, he does so in the context of 
repairing ethics codes’ deficiencies when it 
comes to confronting a particular set of ethical 
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decisions. Martinson is not attempting to replace 
codes with an alternative approach to public 
relations ethics. Rather, he advances the idea of 
seeking some kind of middle way between 
competing demands and expectations, 
recommending practitioners resolve a conflict 
between serving their client’s interest and the 
public good by responding “to the legitimate 
concerns of the client and the news media, but 
not in such an extreme fashion that his or her 
professional and ethical obligations to one are 
sacrificed in an effort to serve the wishes of the 
other” (2000, p.20).  
Martinson’s basis for this recommendation is 
his interpretation of Aristotle’s description of 
virtue as “a kind of mean, since … it aims at 
what is intermediate” (Aristotle, 1941, 
1106b27). However, as Harrison (2004) points 
out, both Martinson (2000) and Walle (2003), 
who followed his lead, misinterpret Aristotle on 
this point. Martinson (2000, p.20) is interpreting 
the following passage from Aristotle’s ‘Ethica 
Nicomachea’:  
 
Virtue is a state of character concerned 
with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. the 
mean relative to us, this being 
determined by a rational principle and by 
that rational principle by which the man 
of practical wisdom would determine it. 
Now it is a mean between two vices, that 
which depends on excess and that which 
depends on defect; and again it is a mean 
because the vices respectively fall short 
of or exceed that which is right in both 
passions and actions, while virtue both 
finds and chooses that which is 
intermediate. (Aristotle, 1941, 1106b36, 
emphasis added) 
  
However, the mean Aristotle refers to does 
not envisage balancing any competing duties 
and obligations (Harrison, 2004) to be found in 
ethics codes. While Martinson reads Aristotle as 
saying that it is the intellectual virtue of 
“practical wisdom” that enables us to choose 
that which lies upon the mean, in fact Aristotle 
(Aristotle, 1941, 1106b36) is saying it is the 
moral virtue or state of character, which lies on 
the mean. It is moral virtue that “makes us aim 
at the right mark”, not practical wisdom (an 
intellectual virtue) which allows us to identify 
and “take the right means” towards the end 
identified by moral virtue (Aristotle, 1941, 
1144a8).  
 
Habits 
 
Martinson (2000) is right to assert that 
Aristotle sees moral virtue as comprising habits 
acquired by doing virtuous acts, but he pays 
insufficient regard to Aristotle’s view that these 
habits are dispositions to feel pleasure at 
virtuous actions (Aristotle, 1941). Virtue 
therefore lies not in an action (thus rendering 
action-oriented codes redundant) but rather in 
the feelings an individual or agent associates 
with this action. While Aristotle does discuss 
some examples of deficit and excess in relation 
to action, an analysis of the relation between 
passions and virtues is necessary to illuminate 
the dynamic Aristotle is describing. (See Table 
1 for a list of the virtues and their corresponding 
vices.) 
While both a virtuous person and one without 
virtue can perform the same virtuous action, the 
former experiences pleasure and the latter 
experiences it as unpleasant or painful. 
According to Aristotle, it is as a result of 
misdirected or inappropriate feelings of 
“pleasure that we do bad things, and on account 
of the pain that we abstain from noble ones” 
(Aristotle, 1941, 1104b10). Action-based ethics 
asks whether a particular action is ethical, 
whereas agent-based ethics focuses on the 
individual agent’s character and motivations, 
and asks whether they are virtuous. In doing so, 
the agent-based approach reflects the Council of 
Public Relations Firms’ concern with 
fundamental morality rather than mere rule-
following. 
Aristotle says virtuous behaviour is 
developed through training that adjusts desire by 
acquiring positive habits. He has in mind not 
mindless habits (such as—in our age—always 
putting your car key in your pocket as you leave 
your vehicle), but rather mindful habits that 
reflect in a constructive way Foucault’s (1977) 
idea of disciplinary practices. Take, for 
example, an unfit person who decides to become 
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a jogger. At first, the roadwork is unpleasant 
(and probably painful). Over time, however, the 
jogger’s body may adapt to the point where 
running is pleasurable. This is Aristotle’s 
concept: and when virtue is located in such 
apposite feelings, discussing virtue in 
Aristotelian terms requires attention to desire, 
passion, pleasure, and pain just as much (if not 
more) as to reason and rational calculus. In this 
light, individual public relations practitioners 
cannot escape attending to their motivations as 
well as their moves, their passions as well as 
their purpose. 
Consider the case of a practitioner who treats 
someone they wish to influence to lunch, relying 
on the meal to function as a persuasive clincher. 
Of course, there is pleasure (and occasionally 
indulgence) in a fine meal and perhaps 
enjoyable company. But if the person taken to 
lunch succumbs to the schmoozing in a way that 
would not have happened without it, they are 
being led astray from the good if they act on 
some matter (such as a decision on awarding a 
contract) because of the pleasure in the meal 
rather than in serving the intrinsic good of the  
matter. The virtuous person would feel 
discomfort rather than pleasure in this situation: 
they would feel uncomfortable at the attempt to 
manipulate through legitimate enjoyment of 
food. When public relations uses techniques like 
this it can be exploiting people’s vices to 
achieve results, rather than acting in accordance 
with virtue.  
Contra Martinson (2000), while Aristotle 
does describe virtue as the mean in relation to a 
passion between deficit and excess (1941, 
1106a28), the mean of most of the virtues is not 
simply situated between excess and deficit of 
the passion involved. Rather, it involves a quite 
different psychological orientation towards self 
than that of the vices: for example, one that 
includes a focus on pursuing excellence even at 
considerable personal cost.  
In the next section of this paper we delve 
more deeply into Aristotelian virtue ethics, 
seeking to adjust some misinterpretations and to 
identify points at which this ethical approach 
can aid practitioners’ understanding and 
performance of public relations activity. 
 
 
 
Table 1: Table of Virtues (by K. Harrison based on Aristotle’s discussion in his 
Nichomachean Ethics)  
  
 
*Concepts that Aristotle had no word for. Sometimes we do, which tells us something about social change. 
Obsequiousness for example is such a prominent vice for us that we have lots of (vulgar) words for it. 
Passion Deficit Mean Excess 
fear (1115) rash courage coward 
appetite (pleasure) (1117) asceticism* temperance self indulgence 
greed (money) (1119) meanness liberality prodigal 
judgment (riches) (1122) niggardliness magnificence vulgarity 
self-regard (1123) false humility pride vanity 
desire for honour (1107) unambitious * ambitious 
anger (1124) wimp* good temper irascibility 
shame (1108) shameless modest bashful 
desire for approval (1126) churlish * obsequious 
self presentation (1127) mock modest truthful boastful 
sense of humor (1128) boorish ready witted/tact buffoon 
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Opposition 
 
In his discussion about applying Aristotelian 
ethics to public relations, Harrison (2004) 
contrasts his approach with that of Martinson 
(2000) and Walle (2003), who follows 
Martinson on this point, by using the idea of a 
triadic opposition to show that the mean is not 
the midpoint between excess and deficit (as 
Martinson suggests). Rather the vices of excess 
and deficiency oppose both each other and their 
corresponding virtue. Like Martinson, however, 
Harrison neglects the differing orientation to the 
relevant passion that is central to this 
opposition, and concentrates on the virtues and 
vices themselves, independently of the passions 
associated with them. 
Whereas Harrison (2004) describes the vices 
of excess and deficit and the mean of virtue as 
being at the opposing points of a triangle, 
Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the 
two dimensions of ego detachment and quantum 
of passion by mapping them along the two axes 
of a graph. This also works as a visual metaphor 
representing virtue as being at the top of a 
physical peak or mountain upon which we 
attempt to balance, like the cart at the top of the 
hill in the diagram. We are liable to roll down to 
the pit (of vice) if we move in either direction.  
 
 
Figure 1: Virtues and Vices 
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The representation in Figure 1 captures 
Martinson’s (2000) emphasis on virtue as a 
mean between vices. It does this by showing, on 
the horizontal axis, virtue on the one hand lying 
between the vice associated with a deficit of 
passion and, on the other, lying between the vice 
associated with an excess of passion. The figure 
also explains the idea of balance and midpoint 
emphasised in Harrison’s (2004) triadic 
opposition by showing, in the vertical axis, that 
whereas both vices result from an over-concern 
with others’ opinions, virtue requires achieving 
the psychological autonomy and independent 
judgement characteristic of healthy adulthood. 
Achieving the peak of psychological integrity 
and ego detachment avoids the excesses or 
deficiencies of passion that push us off the mean 
or balance point down towards vice. 
Interestingly, this psychological interpretation 
of Aristotle’s virtue ethics situates him closer to 
Eastern traditions such as Buddhism, whose 
“criterion of ethics is not theological but 
psychological” (Sangharakshita, 1997, p.128) 
than to the Christian tradition, which 
emphasises accountability to God and the 
development of a different moral outlook 
following conversion (Hanigan, 1983).  
A comparison of false modesty and 
boastfulness with truthfulness, for instance, 
demonstrates the common psychological 
orientation of apparently opposed vices. While 
both false modesty and boastfulness involve 
concern with what others will think of you, they 
differ in their judgments about what will 
impress or avoid antagonising people. The 
truthful person, on the other hand, is plain 
spoken about what they think is the case, 
without worrying about what other people will 
think of them for saying it. A public relations 
practitioner who tells a client what they need to 
hear rather than what they want to hear, resting 
on professional opinion rather than a mere 
desire to please, could be described as 
demonstrating the virtue of courage, as they are 
taking a practice-enhancing action at the risk of 
losing the client or, at the very least, damaging 
the practitioner-client relationship. Such an 
action enhances the practice by running counter 
to popular conceptions of public relations 
people as professional pullers of wool over the 
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public’s eyes who have little or no concern for 
the public’s need or right to see an issue clearly. 
The idea of a practice bears directly on the 
question of virtue-based ethics. 
Caring for some practice or person as we care 
for ourselves is one of the ways we can reduce 
our ego involvement with ourselves. Caring for 
others shifts our focus from our ‘self’. In 
relations of reciprocal caring, like friendship and 
marriage, honesty in self-presentation is a 
precondition. If either of us presents a false 
appearance to the other so that the other will like 
us, only the appearance can be liked, not our 
true ‘self’. Paradoxically, only by ceasing to 
worry what others think of us, can we be liked 
for who we really are.  
While this idea of caring for others as 
ourselves enables us to distinguish caring 
relationships from contractual ones which centre 
on mutual obligation, Ledingham’s (2003) 
account of public relations as concerned with 
“mutually beneficial” (p.185) relationships does 
not. Relationships can be mutually beneficial 
either because the parties care for one another 
and their mutual wellbeing, or because they 
form a coalition of self-interested parties who 
can more effectively compete for resources 
against outsiders by working together. Such 
instrumental relationships are at odds both with 
virtue ethics and with the Kantian categorical 
imperative to treat other people as ends (in 
themselves) not as means (for getting what you 
want).  
Just as caring for a person will help us 
develop courage because we are willing to take 
risks on their behalf, so if we care for a practice 
for its own sake, we will do whatever self-
endangering action is needed to promote the 
practice, even if it earns us disapproval or 
threatens promotion prospects. In caring for the 
practice, we are just as interested in it doing 
well as we are in our ‘self’. We will choose not 
to ‘suck up’ to the people employing us by 
telling them only what they want to hear. 
Rather, we will show both courage and honesty 
by telling them what they need to know if they 
are to be able to act well for the practice. 
MacIntyre (1984) describes a practice as a well-
defined human activity (such as poetry, 
medicine, and chess) and asserts that it is in this 
context that virtues are primarily defined, 
developed, and exhibited. More specifically, he 
defines a ‘practice’ as: 
 
any coherent and complex form of 
socially established cooperative human 
activity through which goods internal to 
that form of activity are realised in the 
course of trying to achieve those 
standards of excellence which are 
appropriate to, and partially definitive 
of, that form of activity, with the result 
that human powers to achieve 
excellence, and human conceptions of 
the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended. (MacIntyre, 
1984, p.186) 
 
What, then, is required to achieve excellence 
in a practice and how is this related to virtue and 
its expression in public relations work?  Doing 
something for its own sake both requires and 
develops the virtues of justice, honesty, and 
courage.  According to MacIntyre (1984):  
 
Justice demands that we: 
• recognise the skills, knowledge, and 
expertise of other practitioners; and that 
we 
• learn from those who know more and have 
greater experience than we do. 
Courage requires that we: 
• take self-endangering risks; 
• push ourselves to the limits of our 
capacities; and that we 
• be prepared to challenge existing practice 
in the interest of extending the practice, 
despite institutional pressures against such 
critique. 
Honesty asks us to: 
• be able to accept criticism; and that we 
• learn from our errors and mistakes. 
 
MacIntyre gives the example of teaching a 
child chess. You might initially bribe the child 
with promise of candy if they win in order to get 
them to play. However, as long as the child only 
plays for the sake of the candy, there is no 
reason for them not to lie, cheat, or steal. If the 
child comes to value chess for its own sake, 
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however, then lying, cheating, and stealing are 
self-defeating and incompatible with the child’s 
desire to develop their capacity to play well. 
Dishonesty such as stealing other people’s 
work or fabricating evidence may result in 
increased prestige and status, but only at the 
expense of the purpose of the activity one is 
engaged in. To the extent that we value the 
activity for its own sake, cheating is self-
defeating. For public relations practitioners to 
be virtuous, then, they need to be able to answer 
the question, “What is it I am doing for its own 
sake that makes actions such as ‘editing the 
truth’ or creating dishonest impressions self-
defeating? What is it in what I am doing that 
requires justice, honesty, and courage to achieve 
its excellence?” A public relations example of 
doing something for its own sake might be to 
undertake pro bono work for a community 
organisation simply because the cause is worthy 
and the practitioner desires to contribute to it for 
that reason alone, rather than doing so because 
of possible networking opportunities or for the 
sake of being seen to be demonstrating good 
citizenship. 
Practices which develop these virtues are 
living traditions that are enhanced through 
historically extended, socially embodied 
argument, in part about the goods which 
constitute the tradition (MacIntyre, 1984). 
Public relations demonstrates this feature of a 
tradition in its engagement with argument 
directed towards achieving consensus as to what 
constitutes its good. The fact that it is having 
this discussion is in itself evidence that public 
relations is operating as a practice in 
MacIntyre’s terms. For virtue to be promoted by 
a practice, the shared conceptions of the goods 
by members of that community must be “the 
raison d’être of … the organisations and 
institutions that control and direct” (Dobson, 
2004, p.7) that practice. Caring about a practice 
also requires, then, being committed to 
reproducing the community engaged in the 
practice, and continuing and extending the 
tradition associated with that practice.  
Longstaff’s (1994) view that ethics codes can 
at most supplement an organisation’s cultural 
transformation and its “active creative 
management” (p.240) of organisational culture 
takes on a new perspective in light of discussion 
about a practice’s internal goods. Longstaff 
proposes that the process of involving all 
members of an organisation in identifying, 
articulating, and committing themselves to the 
organisation’s underlying values “can have a 
profoundly positive effect on the [ethical] 
culture of an enterprise” (1994, p.242). While 
Harrison (2004) argues that Longstaff states 
codes fail because they do not have effective 
sanctions, are not enforced, and are not 
publicised, Longstaff lists these and other points 
as “regrettable” (1994, p.240) examples of 
undesirable processes for developing and 
relying on ethics codes, rather than dismissal of 
codes per se. 
As Dobson (2004) points out, virtue ethics 
casts the firm or professional organisation as the 
community within which collective goals 
(oriented towards a good such as producing 
quality and intrinsically good products and/or 
services) provide opportunities for developing 
and practicing virtue. Community members who 
are committed to the community developing its 
goods will place personal integrity and 
protection of such goods above material 
considerations. If, then, we care for a practice 
for its own sake, we will do what promotes the 
practice, even if it earns disapproval from peers 
or colleagues or threatens our promotion 
prospects. By caring for the practice, we are just 
as interested in it doing well as we are in 
advancing the interests of our ‘self’.  
MacIntyre contrasts such internal goods of a 
practice with external goods (or rewards) such 
as “prestige, status and money” (1984, p.188) 
which are only contingently related to any 
particular practice. (See Table 2, below for 
more information on the contrast between 
internal and external goods.) Achieving the 
internal goods of a practice can only occur 
within that specific practice, whereas external 
goods are transferable across fields of activity. 
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Table 2: Internal vs. External Goods (by K. Harrison based on MacIntyre, 1984, pp.188-
194) 
 
 
*Dobson (1997) characterises internal goods as 1) unique to a particular activity; 2) intangible; and 3) not of finite 
supply. 
 
In the next section of this paper, we discuss 
what pursuing internal goods might mean for 
public relations practitioners, contrasting this 
approach with applying ethical tests and codes. 
We highlight how a virtues-based approach can 
be more challenging and costly for the 
individual than simply using tests or consulting 
codes.  
Costly 
 
Dobson asks, “Are agents who build 
reputations for trustworthiness because it is in 
their material self-interest to do so really in any 
way ethical? What do these agents do when 
trustworthiness is not in their material self 
interest?” (1997, p.5). Game-theoretic attempts 
to prove that morality can arise from self-
interest founder on the fact that if people do act 
out of self-interest or in the pursuit of external 
goods, it normally will only be in their self-
interest to refrain from lying, cheating, breaking 
agreements, stealing, or murder, if there were a 
risk of getting caught (Fukuyama, 1999). The 
farthest self-interest gets us to a commitment to 
the principles of honesty, reliability, respect for 
others, etc., is cultivating the appearance of 
commitment to these principles. Attempts to 
motivate adherence to a public relations code of 
ethics based on external rewards—the “good 
ethics is good business” (Enderle, 2001, ¶.5) 
argument—run foul of the fact that the 
appearance of ethical behaviour can be as 
effective as actual ethical behaviour. While 
some may wish to settle for the appearance 
rather than the substance of ethical behaviour, 
they cannot claim the cloak of virtue for their 
actions. 
Tilley holds that using virtue ethics alone is 
problematic both because of variances between 
individuals’ values and because of the potential 
for practitioners’ personal values to differ from 
those of groups either involved in or affected by 
 Internal Goods* External Goods 
1) • Specific to the practice • Many ways for achieving the goods 
2) • Can only be identified and recognised 
from experience within the practice 
• They can be identified and compared 
by those outside the practice 
a) • Those who lack the relevant 
experience or expertise are 
incompetent as judges 
• Relatively objective and measurable 
observable properties. 
 PRACTICE INSTITUTION 
 • development and use of specific skills 
• excelling in achieving the telos of the 
practice 
• extending the practice in a way 
compatible with its telos 
• prestige 
• status 
• money 
3) public 
• create resources that can be shared by 
whole community 
private 
• competition for scarce resources 
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their activities, for example, across cultures. 
However, the sort of simple ethical rules-of–
thumb such as she refers to (in press, p.12) in 
the context of a wider argument suggesting 
practitioners should work through a stage-by-
stage process of examining ethical issues in 
their public relations campaign planning, are not 
sufficient in themselves either. 
Tilley refers to the so-called “front page test 
(would you feel comfortable with your 
behaviour in the decision you’ve just made 
being on the front page of the newspaper)” and 
the “Mum test (would you feel comfortable that 
your mother, or any significant other whose 
values you admire and approval you desire, 
would applaud your behaviour in the decision 
you’ve just made?)” (in press, p.12).  
Such tests are at odds with the idea of 
developing virtues by pursuing the internal 
goods of a practice. They diverge in two ways: 
 
1. Both the “front page test” and the 
“mum test” identify behaviour to be 
avoided, not the good of the practice 
towards which one is trying to aim. 
They might help practitioners avoid 
the most unethical behaviour, but they 
will not lead them towards virtue. 
2. Both the tests are oriented towards 
what others think. Given that 
(according to Aristotle) vices result 
from being overly concerned about 
what others think, whereas virtue 
requires that one not be overly 
concerned with what others think, 
both these tests will promote the 
development of psychological 
tendencies at odds with virtue, rather 
than fostering those that promote it. 
 
While for-profit organisations are legally 
obliged to maximise profits, such external 
rewards for action cannot serve as values that 
will motivate ethical behaviour in their members 
(they may well promote various kinds of 
behaviour, but not behaviour that can be 
recognised as virtuous in Aristotelian terms). 
According to Longstaff (1994), if organisations 
are to improve their ethical performance, they 
need to identify and commit themselves to the 
values of the internal goods of the practices they 
sustain, not the external rewards they derive 
from doing so. 
Acting ethically and being prepared to 
gainsay external rewards for the sake of internal 
ones is, of course, not easy. MacIntyre’s (1984) 
description of the unavoidable tension between 
the internal goods of a practice and the 
institutions which sustain them reminds us of 
this point. MacIntyre notes that institutions 
entice individuals away from the good of the 
practice by offering them external goods as a 
reward for their contribution to the institutional 
acquisition of money, resources and power. In 
his ‘Rhetorica’, Aristotle goes so far as to say 
that “most men are bad—slaves to greed, and 
cowards in danger” (Aristotle, 1941, 1382b4).  
To the extent that a corporation or profession 
is primarily focused on external goods, such as 
profit or reputation, rather than the quality and 
intrinsic good of the services or products it 
produces, it can neither qualify as a practice nor 
develop the virtues. If rejecting a focus on 
external goods such as profit and reputation 
“challenges the very tenets of western corporate 
culture” as Dobson (1997, p.5) suggests, then 
opening the gates to virtue ethics may indeed be 
a Trojan horse for western corporate culture.  
For virtue ethics to be relevant to public 
relations practitioners without opening the door 
to drastic consequences, it needs to determine 
not what principles we should abide by (as 
ethics codes prescribe), nor what others would 
think of us (as the ‘front page test’ and the 
‘mum test’ mentioned by Tilley would have us 
do), nor “how ought a person of good character, 
a person of integrity, feel and act in this 
situation?” as Harrison (2004, pp.2-3, emphasis 
omitted) recommends, but rather, ‘What is it 
that public relations practitioners do of which 
we can be (or are) proud’? 
Phrasing the question this way crystallises 
the issue of the nature of the internal good that 
practitioners may choose to seek for its own 
sake. In focusing on the excellence the practice 
requires, this question functions as an effective 
touchstone for issues of virtue. 
But what exactly is the internal good 
particular to public relations? We move to 
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consider some possible approaches to this 
question: 
 
1. Public relations is an integrative field 
drawing from a range of disciplines: 
psychology, economics, law, sociology and a 
variety of others may be relevant to particular 
public relations programmes. This integrative 
approach has made it hard to distinguish 
features unique to public relations. It has led to a 
plethora of proposed definitions, to debate about 
whether public relations has any theoretical 
foundation of its own, and to attempts to 
delineate boundaries between public relations 
and related activities such as marketing and 
advertising. The definition proposed by the 
Public Relations Society of America, that 
“Public relations helps an organisation and its 
publics to adapt mutually to each other” (PRSA, 
n.d.a., ¶.4) appears to be an attempt to define 
public relations’ internal good. 
Public relations people are expert in 
facilitating and managing this mutual 
adjustment process. While ‘relationship 
counsellors’ and therapists exist to help 
individuals with relationship difficulties, public 
relations’ special field is to fulfil such a function 
at an organisational level: to help organisations 
(corporate communities) build and enhance 
relationships with groups within the wider 
community important to the organisation’s 
ability to fulfil its mission. While public 
relations sees itself as directly involved in 
helping organisations achieve strategic goals, it 
is not enmeshed in the business process as 
immediately as a sales function, for example, 
which operates according to specific dollar 
targets. While aspects of public relations 
counselling may be analogous to management 
consulting (both can be about addressing 
business problems), public relations’ 
relationship focus identifies a good that is 
particular to it. 
Building and enhancing relationships for one 
set of groups does not reduce the quantum of 
enhanced relationships available for other sets 
of groups, so it is not a zero sum game. There is 
not a finite quantity of enhanced relationships in 
the world, whose use reduces the supply for 
everyone else. In fact, one group’s enhanced 
relationships can serve as a model for others, 
and thereby increase the opportunity for 
enhanced relationships for others. 
If excellence and virtue are related to 
community, as Aristotle suggests, then public 
relations’ chief internal good is its contribution 
to maintaining and enhancing the community’s 
health.  This may be the health of the 
community in the sense of everyone who lives 
in a particular place, or the firm as a community 
(Dobson, 1997)2, through facilitating mutual 
adjustment and adaptation between 
organisations and their publics.  
The advocacy model of public relations, as 
discussed in the literature and in point 2 below, 
is one attempt to situate public relations within 
the context of enhancing the community’s 
health, in the sense of everyone who lives in a 
particular place. Point 3 below considers public 
relations in terms of enhancing the health of the 
firm as a community. 
 
2. Edgett (2002), O’Malley (n.d.), and 
Martinson (2004) suggest that just as lawyers’ 
advocacy for particular clients serves “the 
greater common good/public interest” 
(Martinson, 2004, p.2), so public relations 
professionals can be proud of their role as 
advocates for particular clients because in doing 
so they are “promoting and preserving the 
values of liberal society” (Bayles, 1981, cited in 
Martinson, 2004, p.2) by “assisting in 
articulating ideas/viewpoints into the 
marketplace of ideas” (Martinson, 2004, p.2). 
When we compare the “criteria for ethically 
desirable public relations advocacy” developed 
by Edgett (2002, p.22) with the characteristics 
of the existing marketplace of ideas within 
which public relations advocacy takes place, it 
becomes apparent that this market’s structure 
and operation would need to change before 
client advocacy could be guaranteed to serve the 
common good or promote liberal social values. 
Martinson’s recruitment of the metaphor “the 
                                                 
2 We recognise that neither in the sense of everyone living 
in a particular place nor in the sense of everyone working 
for an organisation can ‘community’ be considered an 
unproblematic, homogeneous entity. It is beyond this 
paper’s scope to extend this aspect of the discussion. 
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marketplace of ideas” (2004, p.2) to his 
argument reminds us that persuasion and 
advocacy, whether in economic markets or in 
parliamentary democracies, take place within a 
competitive, adversarial framework. Fair 
outcomes in an adversarial context require 
mechanisms to minimise or eliminate resource 
and power inequalities.  
Several writers—Edgett (2002), O’Malley 
(n.d.) and Martinson (2004) among them—see 
an analogy between advocacy by lawyers and 
that undertaken by public relations practitioners, 
as both operate within adversarial structures. 
However, whereas public funding of legal aid 
and the provision of pro bono legal services is 
available to those who cannot afford to pay 
within the legal system, there would need to be 
something like public funding of public 
relations services for non-profit organisations, 
and the extension of some public relations 
professionals’ existing commitments to 
providing pro bono services, to ensure that all 
parties within adversarial disagreements had 
equal access to professional advocacy. As 
Skinner, Mersham, and Valin (2003) comment, 
“If the advocate serves the client and employer 
interest in that situation [where only one side 
has a voice], who proposes the countervailing 
view?” (p.20).  
If such a mechanism were in place, the public 
relations professional working for a for-profit 
organisation could have more confidence that 
not-for-profit community and environmental 
organisations with different perspectives on a 
particular issue were also receiving appropriate 
and effective public relations advocacy.  
 
3. Even if public relations professionals 
cannot agree on a good distinctive to public 
relations, they can participate in and contribute 
to the internal good of organisations they choose 
to work for, as long as that organisation’s focus 
is on doing something that is good for its own 
sake.  
For example, The Warehouse, a discount 
retail chain in New Zealand and Australia, 
operates a sustainable development policy and 
has as one of its three key values, “the 
environment matters” (Warehouse, n.d.). The 
company is also heavily involved in community 
fundraising and sponsorship. Its concern extends 
to working conditions in the factories forming 
part of its supply chain: it both conducts its own 
on-site visits in Asia and participates in wider 
studies to assess these conditions as well as the 
quality of the goods being produced. The 
company’s policies presumably aim to build 
customer preference through being seen as 
socially responsible, but it is arguable (and we 
argue) that the pervasive nature of these policies 
throughout the organisation demonstrates a 
commitment to sustainability and social 
responsibility for their own sakes. A public 
relations practitioner working for The 
Warehouse would both share in and be able to 
help enhance the internal good of this 
organisation’s strong orientation towards its 
social, economic, and physical environment. 
However, to the extent that values-oriented 
organisations like this inspire their workers, 
including public relations staff, to put their 
commitment to the organisation above and 
beyond commitment to society at large, there is 
a risk that those working for them will see any 
threat to the organisation as a threat to the good 
itself. Skinner et al. (2003) discuss the risk of 
values-oriented companies inspiring deeply 
committed employees to undertake illegal 
actions in the company’s service. For example, 
Paula de Roeper of the New Zealand state-
owned forestry company Timberlands West 
Coast Ltd, writing in a public relations strategy 
document, described Timberlands’ critics as 
“opponents” and their criticisms as 
“misinformation” (cited in Hager & Burton, 
1999, p.181). While the public relations 
advisors working for Timberlands could be 
described as taking courageous “self-
endangering risks” by providing support to pro-
Timberlands “community groups”, the 
appropriateness of their action has been 
vehemently debated by other practitioners 
(Harrison, 2004; Harrison & Bartlett, 2002; 
Marshall, 2002). 
In fact, it is people’s willingness, indeed 
desire, to work for a company whose values 
they are committed to, and the propensity this 
creates in them to put the good of the company 
before all else, that enables virtue ethics to 
explain how so many ‘good’ people can end up 
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doing questionable things in the service of 
‘their’ company where other accounts of ethics 
would be devoid of explanatory power. 
It is precisely because people’s ethics in 
practice are virtues-based rather than rule-based 
that they may be led astray if the good of the 
company they work for is not also a good for 
society, and particular actions considered in the 
service of the company good are not continually 
tested against the wider social good. Virtue 
ethics can explain, in a way that codes-based 
approaches do not, how ‘good’ people can be 
led into acting badly because they care for the 
wrong person or organisation.  
 
4. Many authors have promoted consensual 
dialogue as the good towards which public 
relations ought to aim. This includes proponents 
of two-way symmetric communication (Grunig 
& Hunt, 1984), those who see public relations as 
the ‘ethical guardian’ of the firms they work for 
(L’Etang, 2003), and those who promote 
Habermas’s communicative ethics (Leeper, 
1996).  
Consensual dialogue is oriented towards 
reaching understanding, rather than winning an 
argument. Success depends on absence of 
coercion, and opportunities for all involved to 
participate in the conversation and raise issues 
of concern. Discussion and exploration of 
multiple perspectives to reach understanding 
and consensus can result in creative re-
conceptualisations that produce win-win 
outcomes.  
In a world in which unequal power relations 
are the norm, rather than the exception, those 
with more power are more likely to impose their 
will to get what they want as well as to maintain 
the inequalities upon which their power 
depends. To the extent that public relations 
professionals are primarily employed by those 
who have the most power and resources (i.e. 
those who can afford to pay for their services) 
their brief is likely to include—in effect—doing 
whatever is necessary to maintain or increase 
such inequalities. 
Because the corporate world’s massive 
resource and information inequalities are not 
entirely conducive to symmetric 
communication, it is unsurprising that Tilley, 
undertaking a survey of large public relations 
firms’ websites, could find only one expressing 
an apparently symmetrical world view: 
Edelman. However, as Tilley also noted, 
Edelman’s self-description on their website, that 
they are in the business of crafting strategies 
that are “constantly monitored—and modified 
as necessary” in response to the firm’s “attentive 
and continuous engagement” (Edelman, cited in 
Tilley, in press, p.6) with stakeholders, is as 
compatible with a strategic adversarial 
relationship as it is with a symmetric one. 
Two-way symmetric communication, then, 
requires not just slight changes to corporate 
behaviour or public relations practice, but the 
sort of fundamental changes to western 
corporate culture that Dobson’s (1997) Trojan 
horse argument might lead us to expect. 
When we consider the potential cost to 
individuals of acting virtuously, Aristotle’s 
judgement seems apt. As MacIntyre says: 
 
The cultivation of truthfulness, justice 
and courage will often, the world being 
what it contingently is, bar us from being 
rich or famous or powerful. Thus 
although we may hope that we can not 
only achieve the standards of excellence 
and the internal goods of certain 
practices by possessing the virtues and 
become rich, famous and powerful, the 
virtues are always a potential stumbling 
block to this comfortable ambition. We 
would therefore expect that, if in a 
particular society the pursuit of external 
goods were to become dominant, the 
concept of the virtues might first suffer 
attrition and then perhaps something 
near total effacement, although 
simulacra might abound. (1984, p.196) 
 
The challenge for public relations 
practitioners trying to act virtuously is to 
identify and work towards a conception of the 
good that is accepted as such within the 
profession. The literature referred to above in 
our discussion of alternatives 1-4 indicates that 
the discussion is well under way. At bottom, in 
the murky world of contemporary capitalism, 
public relations people face a challenge. Will 
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they choose to make their path the more 
demanding one of virtue ethics or will they be 
content with mere rule following – or even the 
appearance of it, knowing that in today’s image-
oriented market, simulacra sell?  
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